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While it is difficult to determine what the courts will consider a
"reasonable regulation" of disbarment proceedings, it must be taken
as generally true that only such statutory regulations will be given
effect as the courts consider to not interfere with their "inherent
power" over the subject.
HENR 0. WEnnoW.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR-MALPRACTICE--OTHER

INJURY

In a Kentucky case decided in 1936 a child was taken to a hospital for a tonsillectomy. One of the child's teeth was knocked out
during the operation and became lodged In its lung. As a result of
the tooth being in the child's lung it died and its parents sued the
hospital in which the operation was performed. The plaintiff sought
to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court rejected the
application of the doctrine saying:
"Where it is left entirely to speculation whether a fact occurred
as a result of want of care or was something not reasonable to be
foreseen, the facts are not sufficient to call for an application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur."1
An early Kansas case seems to clearly enunciate the holding of
the recent Kentucky case above set out. The court held: "The question of negligence or lack of skill in a surgical operation Is one of
science, to be determined by the testimony of skillful surgeons instead
2
of presumptions."
In another case following the Kentucky line of reasoning where
a dentist was removing a decayed tooth and part of it went down the
patient's throat, the court said:
"To say that the doctor had complete control of either the
tooth or the mouthpack would be carrying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur too far for a mishap such as the flying of a fragment of
tooth or filling into a patient's throat while the tooth is being
of negligence or want of skill
extracted, is not of itself evidence
'
on the part of the doctor."
In a case where the facts were similar to the principal case a
California court treated such circumstances contra, saying: "The presumption of a surgeon's negligence arose from child's loss of tooth
following surgeon's insertion of gas preliminary to the operation to
remove tonsils." The court further stated that res ipsa loquitur
applies where during the performance of surgical or other skilled
operations, an ulterior act or omission occurs, the judgment of which
does not require scientific opinion to throw light upon the subject,
1

Hazard Hospital Co. v. Comb's Admr., 263 Ky. 252, 92 S. W.
(2d) 2 35 (1936).
Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 33 (1870).
3 Bollenback v. Bloomenthal, 341 II. 539, 173 N. E. 670 (1930).
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while It would not apply in cases involving the merits of diagnosis and
scientific treatment.'
In Armstrong v. TValaceP it was alleged that a physician, during
a caesarean operation, negligently left a sponge in the patient's
abdomen and closed the incision without removing the sponge. Res
ipsa loquitur was held applicable.
The doctrine Is held applicable in Illinois in malpractice actions
against a physician arising out of his use and control of an electrical
treatment machine. 6
In Vonault v. O'Rourke7 the doctrine was held to have no application to ordinary malpractice cases which involve diagnosis and scientific treatment, but probably to other acts which may be appraised as
regards negligence without recourse to scientific opinion, as where a
surgeon was employed to remove tumor and appendix and patient
sustained burn on chest while under anesthetic.
The courts, although reluctant to apply this doctrine to doctors,
have allowed it In some cases when the act causing the injury is such
evidence of negligence that it can be shown to be such without recourse
to scientific opinion.8
Kentucky has long refused to apply the doctrine to doctors.'
A reason given for such holding is that negligence should be shown
by expert testimony instead of by mere presumptions. Such reasoning has in itself a prohibitive effect in that one doctor will not testify
against a fellow practitioner in good standing. Therefore, without the
benefit of res ipsa loquitur an injured patient is largely without
recourse as to damages against the doctor because the knowledge of
the circumstances causing the injury is rarely obtainable by him.
Another reason for the majority rule was given by former Chief
Justice Taft while sitting on a Federal Circuit bench:
"A physician is not a warranter of cures.
If the Maxim
Ires ipsa loquitur' were applicable to these cases, and a failure to
cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on
Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352, 277 Pac. 134 (1929).
'8 Cal. App. (2d) 429, 47 P. (2d) 740 (1935).
'Adamson v. Magnelia, 280 Ill. App. 418 (1935).
7 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d) 535 (1935).
8 Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933); Hallinan v
Prindle et al., 220 Cal. 46, 29 P. (2d) 202 (1934); Brown v. Hughes,
94 Colo. 295, 30 P. (2d) 259 (1934); Fink v. Steele, 166 Md. 354, 171
Atl. 49 (1934); Crist v. White, 66 F. (2d) 795 (App. D. C. 1933);
Semerjilan v. Stetson, 284 Mass. 510, 187 N. E. 829 (1933); Winters v.
Rance, 125 Neb. 577, 251 N. W. 167 (1933); Doumitt v. Diemer, 144
Ore. 36, 23 P. (2d) 918 (1933); Rosson v. Hylton, 45 Wyo. 540, 22 P.
(2d) 195 (1933).
9Miller v. Blackburn, 170 Ky. 263, 185 S. W. 864 (1916); Hanners
v. Salmon, 216 Ky. 584, 288 S. W. 307 (1926); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mason, 232 Ky. 237, 22 S. W. (2d) 602 (1929); Stacy v.
Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. (2d) 697 (1934).
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the part of the physician or surgeon causing the bad result, few
would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they
would have to assume liability for nearly all the ills that flesh is
heir to."' 0
The doctrine of res ipsa 7oquitur was sought to be applied in
another Kentucky case, Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Corley," decided in
1936. The plaintiff operated a soft drink stand and was severely
injured by the explosion of a beer keg supplied by the defendant. A
tank containing carbon dioxide gas was used to force the beer from
the keg. On the morning of the accident the plaintiff opened the stand
as usual and after a while noticed beer, spewing and foaming from the
top o'f the beer keg, which exploded, causing the injury. After the
accident the valves on the gas tank were found to be defective and
dangerous. Plaintiff claimed that res ipsa loquitur had such application here as would authorize the court to submit the case to the jury
on the question as to whether fermentation of the beer was the proximate cause of the explosion, but the court rejected the doctrine saying:
"The doctrine should only be applied where the nature of the
accident itself not only clearly supports the inference of negligence, but excludes all others, or such as might have been due to
one of several causes, of or which the defendant is not responsible."
Courts do not ordinarily apply the doctrine under circumstances
where all the instrumentalities are not completely under the defendant's control, and where it is a matter of conjecture as to what caused
the injury."
The same reasoning shown above has been followed consistently
in Kentucky decisions as to invoking res ipsa loquitur.u
The holding in the Fehr" case is in all probabilities sound according to the rules of application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
reason for the doctrine, as throwing upon the party charged the duty
of producing evidence, is attributable to the fact that the chief evidence
is accessible to him but practically inaccessible to the injured ptrson.15
"0Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (S. D. Ohio 1897).
"265 Ky. 308, 96 S. W..(2d) 860 (1936).
"Phillippi v. Farmers' Mut. Telephone Co., 113 W. Va. 470, 168
S. E. 762 (1933); Sawyer v. People's Freight Lines, Inc., et al., 42
Ariz. 145, 22 P. (2d) 1080 (1933); Gorden et ux. v. Goldberg et al.,
3 Cal. App. (2d) 659, 40 P. (2d) 276 (1935); Spiegel v. Lacer et al.,
2 Cal. App. (2d) 528, 38 P. (2d) 477 (1934); Biddlecomb v. Haydon,
4 Cal. App. (2d) 361, 40 P. (2d) 873 (1935); Klenzendorf et al. v.
Shasta Union High School Dist. et al., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 164, 40 P. (2d)
878 (1935); Sutcliffe v. Fort Dodge Gas and Electric Co., 218 Iowa
1386, 257 N. W. 406 (1934).
11Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 222 Ky. 736, 2 S. W. (2d) 374
(1928); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Sutton's Administrator, 237 Ky. 772,
36 S. W. (2d) 380 (1931); Black Mountain Corp. v. Partin's Administrator, 243 Ky. 791, 49 S. W. (2d) 1014 (1932); Loebig's Guardian v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S. W. (2d) 910 (1935).
" 5umra, n. 11.
155 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), See. 2509.
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In the Fehr case the gas tank valves were shown to be defective
and the gas tank was not furnished by the defendant. The keg was
shown to be sound and the beer had tasted all right the night before
the explosion, negativing any suspicion of its being abnormally fermenting. Therefore the plaintiff, in fact, had as much chance to know
the cause of the injury as did the defendant and the burden of proof
was justly left with the plaintiff.
Vn~cENT F. KE

TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION
RATE

Y.

AS TO

The question of the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute, taxing
deposits in Kentucky banks at a rate of one-tenth of one percent
annually, as compared to five-tenths of one percent on bank deposits
which are located outside the State, arose in the case of Uommonweath
v. Madden's Exr.1 The appellee's contention is that the above statute
is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution since it attempts to apply different rates of taxation to property of the same class, and that the distinction upon which the legislature bases its power to impose a different rate of taxation is arbitrary
and discriminatory. He contends also, that the State cannot, upon
mere difference of location, justify a difference in rates regarding property In the same class. The entire issue resolves itself to this: Is the
2
classification made by the Kentucky statute, between deposits in Kentucky banks and deposits in other banks located outside the State, a
reasonable classification? If it is a reasonable classification, is the difference in rate between local and foreign banks arbitrary and discriminatory?
Application of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution definitely
indicates that a State cannot apply different rates of taxation to property having the same classification. The state may classify different
kinds of property into different classes and impose different rates of
taxation upon the different classes, but the difference must rest upon
some genuine distinction and not upon one of time or place.
In Louisvi~e Gas Co. v. Coleman,3 the Kentucky
was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment to
Constitution because the statute could not impose a
ing of mortgages having a maturity of more than
tax on the recording of mortgages having an earlier
be considered fair and non-discriminatory.

Mortgage Tax Act
the United States
tax on the recordfive years and no
maturity, and still

1265 Ky. 684, 97 S. W. (2d) 561 (1936).
2 Ky. Stat., Sec. 4019a-1.
3 277

U. S. 32, 72 L. Ed. 770, 48 Sup. Ct. 423 (1928).

